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Insulating Perceived Risks and the
Role of Choice of Law in Cross-Border
Financings
William Blair, Q. C.
Introduction
It is a truism to say that choice of law is a fundamental legal tool in international
financing. This applies as much to transactions involving Latin America parties as any
other. The parties to the transaction will require a particular legal system by which to mea-
sure their respective obligations. When lending out of jurisdictions such as New York,
London, Mexico City, or Buenos Aires, banks in practice require the selection of a law and a
jurisdiction which they consider will insulate them from perceived risks emanating from
the borrower's legal system, and which will ensure an enforcement process which they can
control, should enforcement become necessary. Express governing law and jurisdiction
clauses are, of course, always found in loan agreements and complex financings such as
bond issues, and in the case of sovereign and other public debt, lenders seek to buttress
them with express waivers of sovereign immunity
The limits of an express choice of law need to be kept in mind. It will not resolve all
legal issues capable of affecting a transaction. First and foremost, it is unlikely to have any
place in the insolvency of borrower or bank; insolvency regimes are imposed according to
the dictates of the location of offices and assets, rather than a pre-insolvency choice. Second,
it is unlikely to resolve priority claims between, for example, a bank and a third party
claimant to an asset held as security. Third, a mandatory choice of law is sometimes
imposed by statute; an example is the UK Bills of Exchange Act 1882. Fourth, an express
choice of law will be inoperative to circumvent the mandatory rules of the forum; an exam-
ple is sanctions regulations enacted by the forum state or other illegality. Fifth, it will subject
to the forum state's international obligations. Thus as between members of the IMF,
"exchange contracts" are unenforceable regardless of choice of law if contrary to the
exchange control regulations of one of them.
In a number of international banking transactions, express choice of law is either not
the norm or not invariable practice. Examples include bank deposits, letters of credit and
other bank obligations such as performance guarantees. In such cases, identification of the
applicable law requires recourse to the conflict of law rules of the forum concerned. The
purpose of this article is to examine some of these issues as they have arisen in the interna-
tional banking context with particular reference to Argentina and countries in a similar
position, and explain how they have been resolved. This article is written primarily from the
perspective of English law.
William Blair, Q.C., Barrister, 3 Grey's Inn Place, London, England, and Senior Visiting Fellow,
Centre for Commercial Law Studies (London).
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L Choice of law regimes
Two comparisons may be made with the rules obtained in England and the rest of
Europe. Where the issue concerns the application of the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code
(which has been enacted by most if not all states in the Union), section 1-105(1) provides
that:
"... when a transaction bears a reasonable relation to this state and also to
another state or nation the parties may agree that the law either of this state
or of such other state or nation shall govern their rights and duties. Failing
such agreement this Act applies to transactions bearing an appropriate rela-
tion to this state.'
According to the Official Comment, where a transaction has significant contacts with a
state which has enacted the UCC and also with other jurisdictions, the question what rela-
tion is "appropriate, is left to judicial decision. The definition seems to have been left delib-
erately elastic.
In Japan, the Law on the Application of Laws (Horei) provides that the validity and
effect of a juristic act is to be determined by the law of the parties' choice. If the choice of
law by the parties is unknown, the exloci actus is to be the governing law (Article 7). The
choice may be express or implicitI
The classic English choice of law rule was that a contract is governed by the law
expressly or impliedly chosen by the party and in the absence of such choice, by the system
of law with which the contract had its "closest and most real connection".2 Contracts made
after 1 April 1991 are however subject to the rules in the Rome Convention on the Law
Applicable to Contractual Obligations3 which are in many respects similar. The Rome
Convention provides, in effect, a common code for determining the law governing contrac-
tual obligations in all twelve (soon to be sixteen) member states of the European Union. It
may be noted that the Convention applies to a// governing law questions, not merely those
as between member states. Not all contractual matters fall within the ambit of the
Convention. Exclusions include questions of status or legal capacity, wills and succession,
negotiable instruments, arbitration agreements, questions governed by company law
including insolvency, agency, trusts and settlements, evidence and procedure and (in some
respects) contracts of insurance.
Freedom of choice is the fundamental rule enshrined in the Rome Convention. Article
3(1) provides that "a contract shall be governed by the law chosen by the parties. The choice
must be expressed or demonstrated with reasonable certainty by the terms of the contract
or the circumstances of the case." Freedom of choice is not untrammelled. Where all rele-
vant elements are connected with one country only, the choice of a foreign law is not to
prejudice the application of the "mandatory rules" of that country (Article 3(3)). And noth-
ing in the Convention restricts the application of the rules of the law of the forum in a situ-
ation where they are mandatory irrespective of the law otherwise applicable to the contract
1. Hiroshi Oda, Japanese Law, (London, Butterworths, 1991), 416-7.
2. See e g. Amin Rasheed Shipping Corp v Kuwait Insurance Co, AC 50, HL (1984).
3. Incorporated into the law of the UK by the Contracts (Applicable Law) Act 1990.
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(Article 7(2)).4 And the English courts will doubtless continue to apply the rule that a con-
tract will not be enforced "if the real object and intention of the parties necessitates then
joining in an endeavor to perform in a foreign and friendly country some act which is ille-
gal by the law of that country."5
In the absence of choice, the Convention provides that the contract is governed by the
law of the country with which it is most closely connected (Article 4), a formulation almost
identical to that previously prevailing under English law. There is, however, an important
and controversial "presumption" which appears to derive from Swiss doctrine6 and the
effect of which is uncertain, not least in the context of banking contracts. Article 5(2) pro-
vides:
... it shall be presumed that the contract is most closely connected with the
country where the party who is to effect the performance which is character-
istic of the contract has, at the time of conclusion of the contract, his habitu-
al residence, or, in the case of a body corporate or unincorporate, its central
administration. However, if the contract is entered into in the course of that
party's trade or profession, that country shall be the country in which the
principal place of business is situated or, where under the terms of the con-
tract the performance is to be effected through a place of business other than
the principal place of business, the country in which that other place of busi-
ness is situated.
A number of aspects of this "presumption" will be noted. First, it requires the identifi-
cation of the "characteristic performance" of the contract. The meaning of this term is
obscure. Where performance by one of the parties takes the form of the payment of money,
the Giuliano-Lagarde Report 7 states that it is not such payment which is the characteristic
performance of the contract, but rather the performance for which the payment is due. It
had been frequently pointed out that contracts of a financial nature do not easily fit into
this concept Second, it is not the law of the place of performance that governs, but rather
the law of the place of residence of the party who is to perform. Translated into corporate
terms, that means the place of the central administration of the party concerned, or, in the
case of a contract entered into in the course of that party's trade, the country in which its
principal place of business is situated. Third, and this is significant in the context of branch
banking, where under the terms of the contract performance is to be effected through a
place of business other than the principal place of business, the law of the country in which
that other place of business is situated will govern. Thus where a banking transaction is
entered into through a branch, it is likely to be the law of the place of the branch that gov-
erns. In case of difficulty, Article 4(5) provides that the presumption does not apply at all if
characteristic performance cannot be determined, and is to be disregarded if it appears
from the circumstances as a whole that the contract is more closely connected with another
country. This imports a degree of judicial discretion.
4. Article 7(1) does not apply in the United Kingdom.
5. Foster v Driscoll 1 KB 470 at 521 (1929); Regazzoni v K C Sethia Limited, 2 OB 490 (1956).
6. Dicey & Morris, The Conflict of Laws, 12th edn, 1233.
7. Which was published with the Convention and has a special status in the interpretation of the
Convention.
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Once ascertained, the applicable law governs questions of interpretation, performance,
damages and limitation (Article 10). Separate provisions deal with material validity, formal
validity and incapacity. Article 15 excludes the doctrine of renvoi, by providing that the
application of the law of any country specified by the Convention means the application of
the rules of law in force in that country other than its rules of private international law. It
may be concluded that, despite obscurities, the Rome Convention provides a welcome
bench mark which should result in uniform choice of law rules developing throughout the
European Union. The interpretative difficulties will be resolved by decisions of the courts
over time.
H. Identifying the applicable law
Two examples from the English case law neatly illustrate the significance of identifying
the applicable law. In 1933, the U.S. Congress abrogated the rights of obligees of dollar
obligations to require payment in gold. The court8 held that this had the effect of extin-
guishing the contractual right of bond holders to payment in gold, because the contract
concerned was governed by U.S. law. By contrast, in 1949, the Greek government declared a
moratorium on payment of certain Greek bank bonds. It was held 9 that since English law
was the governing law of the bonds concerned, the nature of the obligation could not be
varied by the Greek legislation.
It does not follow that the law of the place of performance is without significance. In
the case of financial obligations, that law may dictate the manner in which the obligation is
to be discharged (as opposed to the scope of the obligation). For example, the requirements
of a valid "tender" (by which a debtor makes a binding offer to discharge an obligation) are
likely for practical reasons to be governed by the law of the place of performance. Where
performance of a foreign currency obligation is to be made in England, the rule is that if
payment in the foreign currency is impossible, the debtor must pay in sterling.10 And more
generally, the courts will not require an act to be done which is illegal in the place of perfor-
mance (see below).
111. Express choice of law clauses
As has been seen, the Rome Convention recognises the principle of "party autonomy'
or freedom of choice, long applicable under English law.I I Express choice of law clauses call
for little comment here. In English practice, formulae frequently found include such phras-
es as the contract is "governed by", or "to be construed in accordance with", or "subject to"
the law concerned.12 By Article 3(1), the parties can select the law applicable to the whole or
a part only of the contract. Thus, in principle, it appears open to parties to select different
laws to govern different parts of the contract. It may be noted that the terms of Article 3 do
8. R vinternational Trustee for the Protection of Bond Holders, AC 501, HL (1937).
9. National Bank of Greece v Mediss, AC 509, HL (1958).
10. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers' Trust Go, QB 728 (1989).
11. Vita Food Products Inc v Unus Shipping Go, AC 277, HL (1939).
12. Dicey & Morris, supra note 6, at 1217.
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not require the choice of law clause to appear in the particular contract concerned. So
where the series of transactions are governed by a master contract, it will be sufficient if the
choice of law clause appears in that contract, as in Section 13 of the International Swap
Dealers' Association Master Agreement. To take a further example, if a contract incorpo-
rates standard terms which include a governing law provision (such as the ICC Uniform
Rules for Demand Guarantees) this will amount to an express choice of law within the
meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. The parties are free to vary the applicable law,
though without prejudice to the rights of third parties (Article 3(2)).
IV Applicable law in the absence of an express choice
The governing law rules applicable to a number of international banking transactions
which are not, or not invariably, the subject of an express choice of law, will now be consid-
ered.
A. Bank deposits. In law, a bank deposit is a debt owed by the bank to the depositor. As
such, it is a species of property that can be transferred voluntarily (by assignment) or com-
pulsorily (e.g. by expropriation). In English law,13 and in some of the American cases, the
debt is regarded as localized at the branch at which the account is kept. Where the country
in which the branch is situated and the currency of the deposit coincide, it is plain that the
law of that country will govern the deposit. More difficult issues arise in the case of a
"eurocurrency" deposit; i.e., a deposit in the currency of a country other than that of the
place of the deposit. In an important series of cases concerning the effect of U.S. sanctions
against Libya, the English courts have held that eurodollar deposits in London are subject to
the same governing law rules as apply to sterling deposits. It was held that as a general rule,
the contract between a bank and its customer is governed by the law of the place where the
account is kept, in the absence of agreement to the contrary.14 Solid grounds are needed for
holding that the general rule does not apply, since there is a risk of difficulty and confusion
if the law of some other place was held to govern the deposit.s
In reaching this conclusion, the courts rejected the contention advanced by the U.S.
banks holding the deposits to the effect that a term was to be implied by custom and usage
that dollar deposits are invariably cleared through New York It was held that the depositor
was entitled, if necessary, to demand repayment in cash, as in the case of a deposit in
domestic currency. The significance of the decision (which is sometimes overlooked) is that
a eurocurrency obligation was correctly treated as a monetary obligation equivalent to a
deposit in domestic currency and not, as the banks had argued, merely as an account
entry. 6 It is not believed that the result of these cases has been changed by the coming into
force of the Rome Convention. Applying the presumption in Article 4(2), "characteristic
performance" should be regarded as the repayment of the deposit. The party which is to
effect that performance is the bank. Under the terms of the contract, performance is to be
effected through the branch where the account is kept. It is the law of the country where the
13. Joachimson v Swiss Bank Corporation, 3 KB 110, CA (1921).
14. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers' Trust Co, QB 728 (1989).
15. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Manufacturers' Hanover Trust Co (No 2), 1 Lloyd's Rep 608 (1989).
16. For a fresh perspective see Kwaw, Towards the Creation of a Legal Rftime for the Operation of
Euro Currency Deposits, 43 ICLJ 317.
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branch is situated therefore which should govern the deposit regardless of the currency of
the deposit This view appears to be consistent with that expressed in the Giuliano-Lagarde
Report which states (admittedly somewhat opaquely) that "in a banking contract the law of
the country of the banking establishment with which a transaction is made will normally
govern the contract"
B. Letters of credit. A letter of credit transaction involves a number of separate con-
tracts. The buyer contracts with his own bank to open the credit. The buyer's bank instructs
its correspondent bank to advise and/or confirm the credit to the seller. This gives rise to
four separate contracts each of which is (theoretically) capable of having a different govern-
ing law. It may be noted that the Uniform Customs and Practice (UCP) which is invariably
incorporated into creditsl 7 does not contain any governing law provisions. The issue has
had to be resolved by the courts. Prior to the coming into effect of the Rome Convention,
the English courts had held that the contract between the issuing bank and the beneficiary
is governed by the law of the place where payment is to be made against documents.18 In a
post- Rome Convention case, it has similarly been held that the focus of performance is the
branch of the confirming bank where the documents are to be presented, and that the
applicable law governing the issuing/confirming bank contract and the confirming
bank/beneficiary contract is that of the country where the branch was situated. The court
also expressed the view that this law governed the contract between the issuing bank and the
beneficiary. The policy ground of maintaining consistency between the contracts involved
justified the court in using Article 4(5) of the Convention to ignore the characteristic per-
formance test required byArticle 4(2). 19
C. Bonds and guarantees. In a typical bond transaction, the party required to provide
the bond (for example a building contractor providing a performance bond in respect of a
construction contract) instructs its bank which in turn instructs its correspondent in the
beneficiary's country to issue a bond against its own counterguarantee. Again, there are four
separate contracts concerned. There is also a close link to the underlying construction con-
tract, since the bond is intended to be callable in the event of failure to perform. In the
absence of an express choice of law, one difficult question is how the governing law of the
various contracts concerned inter-relate. In one case it was said:
'Almost every letter of credit or performance bond is issued pursuant to
some underlying commercial transaction. Yet we were referred to no case
where it had even been argued that one was affected by the proper law of the
other. Seeing that the letter of credit or performance bond is intended to be a
separate transaction, I would hold it is not so affected, and is ordinarily gov-
erned by the law of the place where payment is to be made under it. This is in
general accord with the rule applicable to the banker/customer relationship
arising from a current or deposit account, which is ordinarily governed by
the law of the place where the account is kept. 2 0
But the difficulty in equating governing law with the place of payment in the case of a credit
17. The current edition, UCP 500, came into effect on 1 January 1994.
18. Offihore International SA vBanco Centrale SA, I WLR 399 (1977).
19. Bank ofBaroda v Vysya Bank Limited, Lloyd's List, 29 Jan 1994.
20. Attock Cement Co v Romanian Bank, 1 WLR 1147, CA (1989).
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or guarantee is that the place of payment may bear no relation to the transaction con-
cerned. For example, in a dollar denominated transaction payment may be designated to an
account in New York. If New York is otherwise unconnected with the transaction, it seems
anomalous that its law should govern. In more recent cases concerning the governing law of
counter-guarantees the inter-relationship of the instruments has been emphasised, it being
held that the law of the counter-guarantee should follow that the bond,21 and this is also the
result that may follow under the Rome Convention. Unlike its counterpart, the UCP, the
ICC Uniform Rules for Demand Guarantees (April 1992) does contain a governing law and
jurisdiction clause. (The rules, of course, only apply if specifically incorporated in the
instrument concerned). Article 27 provides:
"Unless otherwise provided in the Guarantee or Counter-Guarantee, its gov-
erning law shall be that of the place of the Guarantor or Instructing Party (as
the case may be), or, if the Guarantor or Instructing Party has more than one
place of business, that of the branch that issued the Guarantee or Counter
Guarantee'
D. Negotiable instruments. The Rome Convention does not apply to obligations arising
under negotiable instruments to the extent that the obligations arise out of their negotiable
character.22 The English choice of law rules applying to negotiable instruments are partly
contained in statutory rules23 to the effect that formal requirements are governed by the law
of the place of issue, and the interpretation of the drawing, endorsement or acceptance is
determined by the law of the place where such contract is made. The holder's duties with
respect to protest and notice of dishonour are determined by the law of the place where the
instrument is dishonoured. These rules seem to be mandatory, and cannot be contracted
out of. The better view is that there is no objection to an express choice of law clause which
will take effect subject to the mandatory statutory provisions, and Eurobond issues do con-
tain such clauses.24
V The impact of choice of law
As the bond issue cases show, governing law can have a decisive impact on a financial
transaction. Five factual situations are now briefly considered.
A. Expropriation. Financial assets such as bank deposits are, in principle, as vulnerable
to expropriation as other forms of property. The United States courts in particular, have had
to consider the effect of such expropriations most recently in relation to Cuba25 and
21. Turkiye Is Bankasi v Bank of China, 3 Bank LR 34 (1994); Wahda Bank v Arab Bank Plc 3 Bank
LR 70 (1994), (the latter case is at the time of writing under appeal).
22. Art 2()(c).
23. Bills of Exchange Act 1882, Section 72; the Act only applies to bills, notes and cheques.
24. See the discussion in Tennekoon, The Law & Regulation of International Finance (London,
Butterworths, 1991), 165-9.
25. Garcia v Chase Manhattan Bank, 735 F.2d 645 (2d Cir., 1984); Perez v Chase Manhattan Bank, 61
N.Y. 2d 460,463 N.Y.2d 5,474 N.Y.S.2d 689 (1984).
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Vietnam. 26 The ultimate issue in such cases is that generally whether the depositor can
require repayment by the bank's head office in New York. Amongst the considerations used
by the U.S. courts to determine the issue have been (1) the identification of the situs of the
debt concerned and (2) the act of state doctrine by which the acts of a foreign sovereign
which come to fruition within that sovereign's territorial control are held to be outside the
purview of the American courts. Although in the result the home office has frequently been
held liable for the debts of its branches, no generally applicable rule has been established. 27
Situs has been treated as decisive in the English case-law. The leading case arose out of the
establishment of the State of Israel in 1948, when under Israeli law a bank deposit held by
the plaintiff at the Jerusalem branch of an English bank was vested in the Custodian of the
Property of Absentees. The depositor sued the bank in England, but it was held that since
the deposit was situated in Israel, it became subject to the legislation of that State and was
validly vested in the Custodian. 2 8
B. Moratorium. Bank debts may, of course, be affected by governmental acts short of
expropriation. Again, the U.S. courts have tended to stress the importance of situs on the
effect of such acts. In a series of cases, it was eventually held that U.S. bank loans were unaf-
fected by a moratorium imposed by Costa Rica, because the loans were payable in New York
and therefore the situs of the debts was outside the territory of the foreign sovereign. 29 The
most recent U.S. case concerns the effect of a 1983 Philippine Government restriction on
the repayment of foreign currency deposits in the Philippines. The ultimate result of the
case30 was that the depositor could recover in full from the U.S. parent bank. However in
the process (the case went all the way to the Supreme Court)31 what has been described as a
"sterile distinction 32 emerged between the place of payment, being the place where the acts
constituting payment are intended to be carried out, and the place of collection being the
place where the creditor is entitled to obtain satisfaction in the event of the debtor failing to
pay at the place of payment The case was ultimately decided on the basis that there was no
restriction in the party's deposit agreement on the situs of collection. The English courts
take what, it is submitted, is a simpler and more satisfactory approach to this sort of prob-
lem. A foreign moratorium or similar measure will only effect a debt if (a) the foreign law
governs the contract, or (b) performance is required under the contractual terms to be
made in the state concerned. The latter is an example of the principle that an English court
will not enforce a contract which is illegal in the place where performance is required.33
C. Third party freeze. The operation of the English principles is neatly illustrated by the
26. Vishipco Line v Chase Manhattan Bank, 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir., 1981); Trinh v Citibank NA, 850
F.2d 1164 (6th Cir., 1988).
27. See Telanoff, American Parent Bank Liability for Foreign Branch Deposits, 18 Pepp. L Rev. 561
(1991).
28. Arab Bank Ltd v Barclays Bank, (DCO) AC 495, HL (1954).
29. Libra Bank v Banco Nationale de Costa Rica, 570 F Supp 870 (SDNY, 1983); Allied Bank
International v Banco Credito Agricola v Cartago, 757 F.2d 516 (2d Cir., 1985).
30. Wells Fargo Asia v Citibank, 936 F.2d 723 (2nd Cir., 1991).
31. Citibank v Wells Fargo Asia Ltd, 109 L.Ed.2d 677 (1990).
32. Mann, The Legal Aspect of Money, 5th edn, 220.
33. Ralli Bros v Compania Naviera Sota yAznar, 1 KB 614 (1920). The precise nature of the principle,
and the effect of the Rome Convention on it is discussed in Dicey, supra note 6, at 1343-47.
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litigation caused by economic sanctions unilaterally imposed by the US during the 1980s on
Iran and Libya. Presidential decrees froze dollar balances, including those held at foreign
branches of U.S. banks. Though the Iranian freeze was ultimately resolved politically, the
Libyan freeze was not and in a series of cases, the English courts ruled that the U.S. mea-
sures did not affect the depositor's right to repayment in England. The reasoning was that
the deposits were governed by English law, so that illegality under U.S. law was irrelevant As
to the place of performance, it was held that though under normal conditions clearance of
the balances would have been in New York through CHIPS (the Clearing House Interbank
Payments System) there was no term of the contract that required payment to be made in
New York by this method.34
D. Extra-territorial orders. The tendency of the U.S. courts to make extra-territorial
orders requiring banks to disclose information held outside the U.S. has given rise to juris-
dictional dashes in a number of countries. Where the accounts concerned are held in
England, the courts have decided that English law rules of confidentiality preclude compli-
ance with the U.S. orders. 35 The banks concerned have frequently found themselves in
impossible positions, which the U.S. courts have sought to resolve by requiring "good faith"
efforts to comply with the orders concerned. 6
E. The fraud exception. In practice, the rigour of the approach of national laws to pro-
hibiting payment of a letter of credit or bank guarantee varies. English law takes a particu-
larly tough stance, on the basis that bank obligations must be honoured short of "estab-
lished fraud"37 Where a law other than English law applies to the instrument concerned, a
different and lesser standard may apply.38
VI. Law governing third party claims
Choice of law issues in the banking context normally arise as between contracting par-
ties, but it is sometimes necessary to identify the law governing relations with third parties.
This was graphically illustrated by litigation following the death of Robert Maxwell, who
pledged shares in Berlitz belonging to the New York publishers, Macmillan (then part of the
Maxwell Group), to various banks. The pledges were in support of lending to unrelated
companies. Following Maxwell's death, Macmillan brought proceedings in the English
courts to recover the Berlitz shares. The banks resisted the claim on the basis that they had
taken the shares for value in good faith without notice. The shares had passed to the banks
through the DTC (Depository Trust Company), the paperless clearing system in New York.
The court held39 that questions of priority between the holders of competing interests in
the shares of a corporation depend on the effect of the transfer which created the later
interest on the transferor and the persons claiming under him and are governed by the lex
34. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v Bankers' Trust, QB 728 (1989); Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v
Manufacturers' Hanover Trust Co (No 2), 1 Lloyd's Rep 608 (1989).
35. XAG v A Bank,2 AlI ER 464 (1983).
36. There are many U.S. cases; see e.g., SociitM Internationale v Rogers, 357 US 197 (1958).
37. United City Merchants v Royal Bank of Canada, I AC 168, HL (1983).
38. See for example, Wahda Bank vArab Bank Pk, 3 Bank LR 70 (1994).
39. Macmillan Inc v Bishopsgate Investment Trust, unreported, 10 Dec. 1993; the decision is under
appeal.
Autunm 1995 69
loci actus, that is to say the law of the place where the later transfer took place. Where, there-
fore, the banks relied for the creation of their security on book entries made in the DTC in
New York the effect of those entries on Macmillan's prior interest had to be determined by
the law of New York. Where the banks had derived title from the deposit of the certificates
by way of security in England and that security was later perfected by book entries in New
York, the effect of those transactions on Macmillan's prior interest again had to be deter-
mined in accordance with the law of New York.40 Competing claims to intangibles such as
shares do, of course, involve special considerations, but in the case of goods and land, third
party claims would for practical reasons generally be resolved by the law of the place where
the property is situated.41
VI. Jurisdiction
Choice of jurisdiction and choice of law are in practice closely allied. Under the com-
mon law, the English courts took jurisdiction over a defendant who could be served in
England (subject to forum non conveniens considerations). The courts exercised powers to
serve out of the jurisdiction in respect, for example, of contracts made in England or gov-
erned by English law.42 In most west European countries including England questions as to
jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgement in civil and commercial matters are now
subject to the 1968 Brussels Convention (applicable to members of the European Union)
and the almost identical 1988 Lugano Convention (applicable to EFTA members, e.g.
Switzerland). The Conventions apply where an action is brought against a defendant domi-
ciled in a Contracting State. The concept of domicile is not defined in the Conventions, but
means broadly (as regards an individual) residence in a particular state, and as regards a
corporation, the state where it has its seat. The fundamental principle is that persons domi-
ciled in a Contracting State are to be sued in the courts of that State (Article 2). There are a
number of exceptions. In matters relating to a contract, a person domiciled in a Contracting
State may be sued in the courts for the place of performance of the obligation in question
(Article 5(1)). In matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, suit may be brought in the
courts for the place where the harmful event occurred (Article 5(3)). And as regards a dis-
pute arising out of the operations of a branch, agency or other establishment, suit may be
brought in the courts for the place in which the branch, agency or other establishment is sit-
uated (Article 5(5)).43 There are also provisions applying to co-defendants, including guar-
antors (Article 6(2)). The philosophy underlying the Conventions is the opposite of the U.S.
"long-arm" jurisdiction which sometimes seems to proceed on the assumption that the U.S.
courts are uniquely well suited to try disputes - even where the link is tenuous. The
40. New York law was favorable to the banks because it contains a "actual knowledge" test, NY-UCC
s-304 (4). On the facts of the case, it was held that the banks would in any event have succeeded
under the English law test.
41. See generally, Dicey, supra note 6, chaps. 22-25.
42. Rules of the Supreme Court, Order 11(1).
43. Though the scope of this provision is in doubt; some case law appears to limit the jurisdiction to
cases where performance is to take place in the same state as the branch; Somafer SA v Saar-
Femgas AG, Case 33/78 ECR 2183 (1978). This construction appears to be doubtful.
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Conventions proceed on the basis that a proper hearing may be obtained in all courts in the
Contracting States.
Where the Conventions are applicable, forum non conveniens considerations do not
apply; in other words the designated court must take the case. The Conventions are howev-
er intended to regulate jurisdiction only as between the Contracting States; the English
courts have recently stayed proceedings against an English-domiciled party (which under
the Conventions would have had to be sued in England) on the grounds that Argentina was
the more appropriate forum for the trial of the issues." Argentina is not, of course a party
to the Conventions.
VHIlL Choice ofjurisdiction clauses
In common with other courts, the English courts give effect to choice of jurisdiction
clauses. Where England is the selected forum, it is desirable to provide in the clause for the
appointment of an agent to accept service (which otherwise has to be effected according to
the rules for service abroad). Jurisdiction clauses are fully recognized under the Brussels and
Lugano Conventions which provide in Article 17 that where parties, one or more of whom
is domiciled in a Contracting State, have agreed that a court or the courts of a Contracting
State are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen in connection with a
particular legal relationship, that court or those courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction.
Where such an agreement is concluded by parties none of whom is domiciled in a
Contracting State, the courts of other Contracting States have no jurisdiction over their dis-
putes unless the court or courts chosen have declined jurisdiction. Article 17 also provides
that if an agreement conferring jurisdiction was conferred for the benefit of only one of the
parties, that party shall retain the right to bring proceedings in any other court which has
jurisdiction under the Convention rules. Loan agreements sometimes state that the jurisdic-
tion clause is for the benefit only of the lender in order to take advantage of this last provi-
sion.
It is common for jurisdiction clauses to be drafted in "non-exclusive" terms, so as not
to restrict the lenders' enforcement options, and the precise status of such clauses under the
Conventions was in some doubt. In Kurz v Stella Musical GmbH45 if was argued that a non-
exclusive submission by an English plaintiff and a German defendant to the jurisdiction of
the English courts was not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the English court over the
German defendant because Article 17 contemplated only exclusive jurisdiction clauses. The
court rejected this argument and held that the non-exclusive choice was valid. The provi-
sion in Article 17 that the chosen jurisdiction was to be "exclusive" meant that the choice
took effect to the exclusion of the jurisdiction which would otherwise be available under the
Convention: but the choice could be of more than one jurisdiction, expressly or impliedly.
The choice of English jurisdiction was valid; and it follows from the judgment that the
defendant could also have been sued in Germany."s
It may be mentioned that arbitration clauses are sometimes substituted for jurisdiction
clauses, particularly as regards sovereign debt. However, it is believed the consensus
44. Re Harrods (Buenos Aires) Ltd, Ch 72, CA (1992).
45. (1992) Ch 196; and see Meeth v Glacetal Case 23/78 ECR 2133 (1978).
46. See Dicey & Morris, supra note 6, at 431.
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amongst lenders remains that arbitration is generally inapt to resolve disputes under loan
agreements. Arbitration clauses may have gained popularity in the U.S. because of fear of
excessive jury awards; under English procedures juries are not involved in civil litigation.
IX Sovereign immunity
Along with choice of law and jurisdiction clauses, immunity waivers may be necessary
to give full effect to the lenders' rights of action. This subject is outside the scope of the pre-
sent discussion, though it will be noted that sovereign immunity in the context of interna-
tional finance was the subject of an important U.S. Supreme Court decision in 1992.47 It
was held that an Argentinian bond issue was a "commercial activity" within the meaning of
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and accordingly not within the immunity from
jurisdiction. A similar exception to immunity exists as regards "commercial transactions"
under the UK legislation (section 3(1) of the State Immunity Act 1978). There are also
important immunities from execution. For example for policy reasons, under the UK legis-
lation, the property of a state's central bank is effectively immune from execution.48
47. Republic of Argentina v Weltoverlnc, 112 S.Ct. 2160 (1992).
48. State immunityAct 1978, s14(4).
